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the Fourth Circuit was animated by a desire to undo Miranda, critics deemed the decision "a heavy dose of conservative judicial activism" 13 and "the most surprising and ill-considered instance of ~udicial activism' in recent memory. "
14
In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court too has been criticized for using Dickerson as a vehicle to advance its ideological preferences. By declaring that Congress cannot overturn Court-created constitutional norms/ 5 the Court's reaffirmation of Miranda has been portrayed as part and parcel of a Rehnquist Court campaign to limit congressional power. For example, commenting that " [t] here might well have been a period, sometime in the last three decades, when the Court would have overturned Miranda," The New York Times's Linda Greenhouse argues that "timing" explained the Court's decision: the fact that "the [C]ourt's interest in protecting its constitutional turf against congressional incursions was at a peak unmatched in recent years." 16 In the pages that follow, I will take issue with this prevailing wisdom. Pointing to the judiciary's Article III duty to decide cases according to the law, I will argue that the Fourth Circuit was correct in paying attention to Congress's mandate that the 1968 statute, not Miranda, set out the "law" governing the admissibility of confessions. -Taylor, supra note 12, at 67. 14 Schulhofer, supra note 12, at A22. Power, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2000, at 1 (quoting a speech by Justice Scalia, suggesting that the Supreme Court should no longer presume acts of Congress to be constitutional because Congress takes the attitude that "'it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution"'). For other news analyses calling attention to the ongoing battle between the Court and Congress, see Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court: The Justices Decide 'Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, at 4-1 (noting the Court's lack of deference to Congress's federal legislation \iews); Suzanna Sherry, Some Targets Were Larger than Others, WASH. Posr,July 4, 1999, at B4 (indicating the Court's term was highlighted by invalidating federal legislation that \iolated state's rights). Ironically, had the Supreme Court ruled the other way in Dickerson, it-like the Fourth Circuit-would have been criticized for its opportunistic, ideological repudiation of Aliranda.
17 This is not to say that the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that the 1968 statute was constitutional. My point is simply that, if constitutional, the 1968 statute trumped Miranda. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (explaining that judicial powers are limited and that the courts must enforce applicable laws). UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 149: 251
Otherwise, litigants could effectively direct courts to decide cases according to their policy preferences, not the law. At the same time, the Clinton administration was not obligated to defend the constitutionality of the 1968 statute. The executive's Article II power to interpret the Constitution certainly extends to the Clinton justice Department's decision to argue that the 1968 statute was unconstitutional but that Dickerson's confession was admissible under Miranda. Faced with a real dispute over the confession's admissibility but unable to direct the government to defend the 1968 statute, the Supreme Court was right in appointing counsel to defend the 1968 statute. None of this is to say that ideology did not animate either the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court. 18 It is to say, however, that core separation of powers principles support the decisions both to consider the 1968 statute and to appoint outside counsel to defend the statute's constitutionality. In other words, while the line separating judicial activism from judicial restraint may be murky, the responsibility for each branch of government to independently interpret the law is clear.
I. PRELIMINARIES
In our tripartite system of government, a system of checks and balances, each branch is empowered to independently interpret the Constitution and, in so doing, to serve as a bulwark against the aggrandizement of too much power in any other branch. Furthermore, each branch possesses core powers-powers that cannot be delegated to another branch. Consider the relationship of the judiciary to the executive. On the one hand, since the "judicial power of the United States" is vested in federal courts, 19 Congress could not transfer this power to executive agencies. "That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system .... " 20 At the 18 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (calling attention to claims that both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court were politically motivated); see also Er- same time, the judiciary must respect the executive's power to enforce the law. For example, the executive possesses prosecutorial discretion: the power to launch prosecutions, introduce evidence, and the like. As such, it would be impermissible for a federal court to assume the role of prosecutor by, say, introducing into evidence a confession that the executive deemed inadmissible.
'What then of the Dickerson litigation? Here, the executive introduced into evidence a confession that it deemed admissible under Miranda, the standard it employs in assessing confessions. 21 And while the criminal defendant, Charles Dickerson, thought the confession should be suppressed, Dickerson agreed with the government that Miranda was the governing rule of law. 22 By applying a different rule of law than the one subscribed to by both the government and Dickerson, the appeals court put its desire to "say what the law is" ahead of the executive's desire to define criminal prosecutions.
How can I say that this decision is grounded in the separation of powers, not a usurpation of prosecutorial discretion-a core executive power? 23 More fundamentally, in the absence of a concrete dispute over the appropriate legal standard, how can I say that the separation of powers requires federal courts to sua sponte raise the 1968 statute?
Let me begin with a confession. When I began thinking about this project, my first impulse was to write a paper condemning conservatives for engaging in the same type of activism that conservatives have long accused liberal judges of, that is, reaching out to decide cases to make law, not resolve concrete adversarial disputes. Specifically, in campaigning against "judicial activism," Ronald Reagan and other conservatives bemoaned "a weakening of the court's resolve to Indeed, Reagan's first Attorney General, William French Smith, "pledged on taking office ... that cases should not be adjudicated where the party bringing the case had only a remote connection with the issues; where the underlying dispute was not 'ripe' ... and where the matter was properly resolved by the political branches, Congress or the executive."
25 Accordingly, for Smith and other conservatives, the separation of powers demands that courts should only review those issues that are truly in controversy and therefore represented by vigorous advocacy.
26
On the surface, the Miranda override litigation appears to be precisely the type of case that Smith had in mind. With no adversarial dispute on the governing substantive legal rule, the question of whether prosecutors should utilize the 1968 statute seemed a political matter best resolved by Congress and the executive, not the courts. To determine whether Congress had overruled Miranda, a court (or so I thought) would have to eschew this "dispute resolution" model in favor of the so-called "public values" model of adjudication.
27 Under the public values model, "the function of the judge ... is not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values."
28 Con-24   WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND jUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 59  (1991). 25 SMITH, supra note 24, at 60. Under this view, when the basis for decision falls outside the framework of the litigants' arguments, "the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties' participation in the decision has lost all meaning." Lon L. Fuller, TheFrmns and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 388 (1978) . Relatedly, "[a]n adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known." !d. at 383. 26 For these conservatives, "the premise of our adversarial system" has always been that federal courts "do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them." Lebron v 1709 , 1822 (1998) (defending judicial advicegiving as a way to "aid our governments in the task of serving their master-the American peo-sequently, concrete adverseness, while perhaps necessary to commence litigation, "becomes unimportant, whatever the stage of litigation, since the primary goal is to resolve the issue, not to settle a dispute between parties." 29 In Dickerson, the fact that the government and Dickerson disagreed over the admissibility of the confession was more than sufficient adversiveness to support judicial resolution of any and all related questions.
At first blush, the Dickerson litigation seemed like a textbook example of the profound difference between the "public values" and "dispute resolution" models. For this very reason, a project calling attention to the willingness of conservatives, both judges and interest groups like the Washington Legal Foundation, to compromise their views on the judicial role in order to advance their policy preferences seemed worth doing. It would highlight the difficulty of placing something as abstract as a vision of the separation of powers ahead of something as concrete as desired policy outcomes.
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The longer I researched and thought about this issue, however, the more I came to doubt my original impulse. More to the point, as I will now argue, the sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and the appointment of amicus curiae to defend the statute's constitutionality is consistent with the "dispute resolution" model of litigation. At its core, the "dispute resolution" model calls upon courts to see Article III as a limited grant of jurisdictional authority. 31 Consequently, in order to respect the primacy of elected government decisionmaking, federal courts must vigilantly police the boundaries of their Article III powers. Accordingly, starting with Marbury v. Madison, the federal pie"). In the typical case, the "dispute resolution" model would see the absence of adversariness as proof positive that the court is without jurisdiction. Dickerson, however, is far from typical. The Department of Justice and the criminal defendant disagreed about whether there was proof to support a criminal conviction. Far more significant (for my purposes), the two sides disagreed over the admissibility of Dickerson's confession. 33 In short, it is clear that the courts had jurisdiction over Dickerson, including jurisdiction over the admissibility of the confession. The question then becomes whether, in resolving this dispute, the court's power necessarily includes the power to take into account the 1968 statute. In part, this is a question of jurisdiction, namely: before determining whether Dickerson's confession is admissible under Miranda, is the question of the 1968 statute's applicability a jurisdictional prerequisite?$4 Alternatively, in exercising its Article III power to decide the confession's admissibility, may a federal court consider legal arguments that it deems relevant but are not raised by either party?
II. ARTICLE Ill AND THE DU1YTO "SAY WHAT THE LAW Is"
The very idea of an independent judiciary is grounded in the belief that it is for the courts to "say what the law is. " 35 During the 1780s, the founders thought it "necessary to guarantee the judges' independence and integrity" in response to a growing mistrust of elected 32 In the Marbury litigation, the litigants did not question the jurisdictional authority of the Supreme Court. 
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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 259 government, especially the legislatures. 36 In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton likewise spoke of the need for the judiciary to remain "truly distinct from both the legislative and the executive, and, in so doing, for the courts to keep elected officials "within the limits assigned to their authority." 37 Accordingly, the "interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. " 38 This belief in an independent judiciary is very much tied to the notion that the "rule of law" should triumph over the "rule of men." 39 By insisting that the political branches "act through general, public rules," the founders embraced "a higher or constitutional law that governs ordinary lawmaking, as well as politically independent courts of law to enforce this higher law against public officials."
40 In this way, the founders saw independent courts testing the legality of government decisionmaking as the best hope of maintaining the rule of law and, with it, protecting citizens against tyranny.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc. 41 Concluding that Congress cannot require federal courts to reopen final judgments, the Court invalidated amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 allowing for the reopening of lawsuits that had been dismissed on technical grounds, namely, the failure to file within the (then pertinent) statutory timelines. 42 Pointing to the Framers' "sense of a sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power," 43 "' See id. at 24{) (holding the amendment unconstitutional "to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment").
"~ /d. at 221.
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[Vol. 149: 251 ture cases." 44 By separating the judicial power "not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them" from the legislative power to prescribe rules, Plaut makes clear that popular government cannot interfere with the court's power to interpret the laws. 45 Plaut, of course, is little more than a modern day application of Marbury v. Madison. 46 Marbury, by declaring that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s] ay what the law is," speaks to the Court's power and obligation to decide cases in accordance with the governing law. 47 And while Marbury is especially concerned with the constitutionality of elected government decisionmaking, the question of whether or not government conforms to its legal obligations is certainly at the heart of the decision.
48
Correspondingly, in holding that courts can order government officials to comply with the law, 49 Marbury makes clear that no one is above the law and, accordingly, that courts will not facilitate disobedience to the law.
50
Like The Federalist No. 78, Marbury equates judicial independence with the power to "say what the law is." As such, it is well established that parties to a dispute cannot agree to bind the court on stipulated questions of law. Otherwise, the rule of men would triumph over the rule of law. For this reason, "[w]hen an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to The duty of courts to look to the law, not just the arguments of litigants, implies that courts can, among other things, undertake independent research to sort out the relevant law, consider the arguments of amici, and address issues necessary to the resolution of the case that neither party raises in briefs or oral arguments. 53 For example, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 5 4 both parties to the case sought to preserve Swift v. Tyson, 55 that is, the federal courts' then-existing practice of applying federal common law in diversity cases. Indeed, Erie's counsel, Theodore Kiendel, saw his primary goal as "preserv [ing] Swift," notwithstanding the fact that Erie would have won under state "-' It also suggests that, when fashioning equitable relief, federal courts may take account of the "public interest." United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). For example, in the context of deciding a motion to vacate a judgment (after the parties entered into a settlement agreement, mooting the merits of the case), the Supreme Court has ruled that: ":Judicial precedents are presumptiYely correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur. ' Erie is important for another reason. In holding that the parties to a controversy do not control "the choice oflaw," the Court made clear that it-not the parties-would decide whether a legal argument is or is not waivable. In some (even most) instances, the law contemplates that the parties to a dispute can waive pertinent legal claims. 58 Other times, however, the law does not allow for waiver. On those occasions, it is the court's responsibility to honor the law, not party preferences. 5 9 Another example of this phenomenon is the "gatekeeping role" the courts have assumed in administering the Federal Rules of Evidence.60 In sorting out whether to admit expert scientific testimony, for example, a judge "should ... be mindful" of all "applicable rules" of evidence. 61 More to the point, whenever the Federal Rules of Evidence mandate a particular course of action, it is the court's duty to adhere to the law and take that mandate into account. 62 That is the lesson of Marbury.
What then of Dickerson? On the one hand, where jurisdiction is clear and the legal issue squarely before the court, Marbury is unequivocal in its demand that the court must make its decision under 56 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITimON 100 (2000) . 57 !d. at 100 (quotation marks omitted). 58 Consider, for example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Under the Act,
person" whose statutory rights have been violated "may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (c) (1994) (emphasis supplied). Here, Congress clearly left it to the affected party to claim or waive her statutory rights, a fact that (before the Supreme Court struck the Act down) several lower courts picked up on in refusing to sua sponte raise the statute. 59 On questions of facts, parties may stipulate to erroneous facts, including the facts of where a transaction took place (something which would affect the choice of law). Parties, however, may not stipulate to the wrong law.
60 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993). 61 Id. at 595. 62 And if the mandate is unconstitutional, it is the court's responsibility to invalidate the mandate and thereby adhere to the supreme law. the governing law. 63 At the same time, the law includes Article III and, as M.arbU1)' makes clear, Article III places real limits on the judicial power. For example, questions irrelevant to the parties in a dispute are presumptively outside the scope of judicial authority. Furthermore, matters committed to the discretion of another branch are outside the purview of judicial review. 64 In the end, Marbury calls upon courts to honor the Framers' admonition that the judicial power (which includes the power to "say what the law is") is "limited to cases of a Judiciary nature. " 65 In applying these principles to Dickerson, the language of the 1968 statute is critically important. If the law grants the executive discretion to choose between Miranda and the 1968 standard, the executive is free to waive its rights under the 1968 statute. But if the law mandates that federal courts-in assessing the admissibility of confessions-adhere to the 1968 standard, courts are duty bound to take that statutory standard into account. Othemrise, rather than "say what the law is," the court would effectively leave it to the parties to stipulate the governing legal standard. 66 Aside from violating their Article III responsibilities, such an approach would undermine Congress's Article I power to respond to Supreme Court decisions through the enactment of positive law. And while prosecutorial discretion is a core component of the executive's Article II powers, this discretion is in no way undermined by an independent judiciary grounding its decisions in the law.m The prosecutor remains free to choose whom it will ''' When there are alternative grounds upon which a court can rule, courts should generally avoid ruling on the constitutionality of an act of Congress. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,]., concurring) ("The Court v.ill not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."). Ashwander, however, does not permit a court to knowingly apply the wrong legal standard in ruling on a case. Ashwander, moreover, does not allow a court to sub silentio assume that an act of Congress is unconstitutional so that it can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a statute. ••· For further discussion, see infra Part III (noting that under Article ll, the separation of powers also protects executive branch prerogative). '' 7 The judicial]' is only supposed to apply the law, not make law in competition v.ith the legislature. Needless to say, Congress could empower prosecutors with the discretion to employ either the statutory standard or li'Iiranda. See infra Part III (discussing Congress's place within the tripartite system). But the decision is Congress's, not the parties. Prosecutorial discretion is about the choice of whom to prosecute and ,,·hat e\idence to introduce, not the legal theories that the courts v.ill employ. Otherwise, the executi,·e would stand above both Congress and the courts. By making use of mandatory language, Congress deemed the prosecution's decision to employ or courts could not demand that the executive adhere to judicial precedent. See infra note 126 (questioning whether courts can ignore executive policies that the parties do not raise). Likewise, Congress could not restrain the executive through the enactment of positive law by, for example, mandating that certain legal arguments not be waived. This strikes me as a profound violation of both Congress's Article I lawmaking power and the court's power to "say what the law is." See infra note 80 (noting the ramifications of allowing the executive to dictate the legal arguments that a court will consider). For this reason, I think that Erwin Chemerinsky has it backwards when he claims that it is for the Justice Department, not the courts, to determine whether or not to employ the 1968 statute. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 297 ("It thus violates separation of powers for a court to invoke § 3501 and consider a confession in circumstances in which the Justice Department chose not to use it.").
Of course, the President, as I argue in the next section, is free to interpret the Constitution and reach the conclusion that § 3501 is unconstitutional. See infra Part III (discussing the President's powers under Article II). Accordingly, notwithstanding what either the courts or Congress says, the President is free to treat Miranda as "law" vis-a-vis executive branch decisionmaking. See infra Part III (noting that the Clinton administration's decision to view Miranda as the governing legal standard was constitutionally protected under Article II). What the President cannot do, however, is run roughshod over the constitutional prerogatives of both the Congress and the courts. For this very reason, I reject the claim that, in Dickerson, the courts should not have ruled on § 3501 but, instead, should have served as advicegivers-telling the political branches what the law is without issuing a binding precedent (so that the question of whether § 3501 has legal force, ultimately, is a political matter to be worked out between Congress and the President). See generally Katyal, supra note 28, at 1711 (discussing the Court's role as an advicegiver).
68 Courts, under Marbury, cannot interfere with matters committed to the discretion of another branch. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. At the same time, by introducing the confession into evidence, the executive empowers the court to apply the law governing the admissibility of confessions. waive the statute legally irrelevant. Consequently, to look to Miranda in assessing the admissibility of a confession, a court would have to ignore a direct command from Congress to make use of the "totality of circumstances" test. In so doing, rather than abide by its Article III duty to "say what the law is," a court (aware of § 3501) would have knowingly applied the wrong legal standard.
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More is at stake here than the Article III duty to decide cases consistent with the law. Honoring executive branch preferences, by using the Miranda standard, would make the judiciary an adjunct in the performance of a purely executive function: the implementation of the law consistent with executive branch priorities. 71 Specifically, if § 3501, not Miranda, is law, the question of whether Miranda is satisfied is only relevant to those prosecutors who see Miranda as the appropriate policy benchmark for the introduction of confessions. Consequently, assuming that § 3501 was constitutional, a decision on whether Dickerson's confession satisfied Miranda would have been a decision about the implementation of Department of Justice policy preferences, not a decision grounded in the law.
True, were a court to rule on Miranda, not § 3501, the binding nature of such a decision would ensure that the court is much more than 7 " Contrary to the plain language of the statute, Erwin Chemerinsky argues that "Congress meant to leave the issue of § 3501 entirely in the hands of the executive branch." Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 307. Relying on a brief filed by the House Democratic Leadership, Chemerinsk)' argues that § 3501 was "favored by those 'much more interested in election year symboli [ an underling of the executive. 72 In contrast, were the executive able to override the court and introduce (under § 3501) confessions found inadmissible under Miranda, the court would subordinate itself to the executive. In so doing, there would be a clear violation of one of the principal checks protecting judicial independence, namely the prohibition against advisory opinions. Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 305. Imagine, for example, that the government dismissed its prosecution. Rather than vitiate the Court's ruling, such a decision would call attention to the power of Dickerson-a decision so potent that it affects the government's choice about whom it will prosecute. None of this is to say that the President could not direct U.S. Attorneys to look to Miranda, not Dickerson, in sorting out whether a confession should be introduced into evidence. Furthermore, whenever a federal prosecutor introduced a confession into evidence, the prosecutor could call on the courts to apply Miranda. See infra Part III (discussing power of presidential review). Nevertheless, assuming that the Supreme Court had upheld § 3501, courts would adhere to § 3501 and, in this way, bind the President. 73 While there is significant disagreement over what constitutes an advisory opinion, there is no question that a decision subject to review and modification by the political branches is a constitutionally prohibited advisory opinion. See Lee, supra note 27, at 643-51. , 101 (1998) (holding that to resolve contested questions of law-even if binding on the partieswhen jurisdiction is in doubt "comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning"). On other occasions, however, the Court has signaled that it would not sua sponte consider antecedent legal issues. For example, in validating (under the Federal Arbitration Act) a private arbitration agreement the Court refused to consider whether the Act even applied to employment contracts. Gilmerv. Interstate/johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991). While acknowledging that several amici discussed the applicability of the Act to employment contracts in their filings, the Court noted that the parties did not "raise the issue in the courts below; it \\'as not addressed there; and it \\'as not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari." ld. at 25 n.2. What the Court did not mention is that there was a near-unanimous consensus that the Act does apply to employment contracts. In other words, the Justices seem disinclined to sua sponte raise an issue that they do not consider relevant to the case's disposition. For further discussion, see supra note 51 (listing cases where amici, rather than the parties to the case, raised legal issues and theories that proved determinative). See also infra notes 132-33 (suggesting that courts have a duty to raise antecedent legal issues).
77 At the same time, the Court did not conclusively hold that it had a duty to rule on the validity of the underl}ing statute. In upholding a D.C. Circuit decision (which concluded that there was such a duty), the Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court "had discretion" to consider this issue. Therefore, the Justices saw no reason to decide whether the appellate court was correct in sa}ing that there was a duty to resolve this issue. To preserve its place in government, the judiciary must respect both the reaches and limits of Article III. Thus, by introducing Dickerson's confession into evidence, the executive opened a Pandora's box that it could not close. Specifically, notwithstanding the parties' failure to raise § 3501, the court had jurisdiction to take into account the law governing the admissibility of confessions. That law (at least untiljune 26, 2000) included § 3501. Consequently, whether or not the question of § 350l's constitutionality can be cast as a jurisdictional one, a court's Article III responsibility to "say what the law is" strongly supports judicial resolution of the § 3501 issue. And while inherent limits on a court's ability to discover statutes and regulations (let alone legal arguments) suggest that courts are not under a duty to discover all relevant law, the mandatory nature of § 3501 suggests that the sua sponte raising of the statute was proper, not simply permissible. 79 so when the issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal statute on which the Department of justice expressly declines to take a position." !d. at 457 n.*. Taken together, these two rulings cast doubt on the Court's suggestion thatto avoid rendering an advisory opinion-it must answer antecedent legal questions by, "should be considered sua sponte at some point in the future").
78 I do not. Like Evan Lee, I would limit the ban on advisory opinions to judgments subject to review by the political branches and to preenactment review, that is, judgments on laws that have not taken effect. See Lee, supra note 27, at 643-44 (describing the various meanings of "advisory opinion"). Moreover, for reasons described above, it is unclear whether the Court really subscribes to this standard. See supra note 77 (discussing the fact that the Court suggests it has authority to render advisory opinons but generally declines not to do so). 79 See infra notes 132-33 (discussing "rule of law" constraints that limit the court's Correspondingly, a Miranda-based ruling would eschew the longstanding presumption that acts of Congress are constitutional and, in so doing, frustrate Congress's Article I prerogative to amend the rules of decision in nonconstitutional cases. 8° Consequently, until the question of § 3501's constitutionality was settled, the courts should have looked for ways not to ground their rulings on Miranda--even if that would have meant the dismissal of the lawsuit.
The Fourth Circuit was correct in sua sponte raising the § 3501 issue in Dickerson. Otherwise (since it thought § 3501 constitutional), it would have confronted a true no-win situation. Specifically, since the district court suppressed the confession on the basis that it violated Miranda, 81 the Fourth Circuit thought it had a choice between (a) applying the correct legal standard and allowing the admission of a valid confession or (b) applying the wrong legal standard and keeping the confession out of evidence. In other words, aside from honoring its Article III responsibility to rule on the law, there were strong pragmatic reasons supporting the decision.
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power to sua sponte raise legal issues and explaining why those constraints do not apply to Dickerson). Furthermore, to honor both Article III and the rule of law, courts should decide cases according to (their understanding ot) the relevant law, including statutes and theories of interpretations uncovered by law clerks, amici, etc. See supra notes 35-57 an accompanying text (discussing the analysis courts should make in determining "what the law is"); infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (describing the need for courts to inform themselves using outside sources in order to determine the "law").
"" Congress, as the Supreme Court recognized in Dickerson, "retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution." 120 S. Ct. at 2332. What then of the Article II prerogatives of the executive branch? Just as Article ill protects the courts from grounding their decisions on the legal theories subscribed to by the parties to a case, the separation of powers also protects executive branch prerogatives. In particular, by independently interpreting the Constitution, presidents need not adhere to "unconstitutional" acts of Congress or to Supreme Court decisions. While there are some limits to the exercise of this power of presidential review, there is no question about President Clinton's authority to conclude both that § 3501 was unconstitutional and that the Dickerson confession was admissible under Miranda.
Before turning to the ramifications of presidential review on the Dickerson litigation, a few words on why Article II empowers a President to disavow judicial and legislative interpretations of the Constitution.83 First and foremost, by presupposing that a President will check judicial and legislative excess, our tripartite system assumes that the executive is independent from, not subordinate to, Congress and the courts. To maintain that independence, a President must be able to decide for herself what the Constitution means. 84 The constitutional sidestep a ruling on § 3501 's constitutionality, I do not mean to suggest that it is ever appropriate for a federal court to knowingly apply the wrong legal standard. 90 Congress has enacted legislation requiring the Attorney General to inform it of cases in which the Justice Department will not defend the constitutionality of a federal statute. 91 In saying that a President need not execute laws that he deems unconstitutional, I do not mean to suggest that there are no constitutional or prudential limits to the exercise of this power. A president, for example, cannot refuse to carry out a judicial order, even if he thinks the order is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution. That type of nonacquiescence would place a President above the Court, render the judicial power a nullity, and ultimately, cast doubt upon the very foundation of democratic government, namely: the rule oflaw. 92 Out of respect for both Congress's lawmak-ing prerogatives and the judicial power to interpret the Constitution, moreover, the executive may defend a statute that it thinks unconstitutional.93 Office of Legal Counsel opinions allow for a President, as a matter of prudence, to defend constitutionally suspect legislation. According to these opinions: "The President should presume that enactments are constitutional" and should "execute the statute, notwithstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue" if he thinks the Supreme Court would sustain the statute. 94 Indeed, even "[w]here the President's independent constitutional judgment and his determination of the Court's probable decision converge on a conclusion of unconstitutionality," the President may nonetheless defend the statute in order "to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of the legislative branch." 9 s Finally, as a matter of pure politics, the President may cast aside his constitutional objections and enforce a statute rather than risk funding cuts, endless oversight hearings, and other forms of congressional opprobrium.96
In the Dickerson case, these principles support the Clinton administration's decision to view Miranda, not § 3501, as the governing legal standard. By independently interpreting the Constitution, the administration concluded that § 3501 was unconstitutional and, consequently, should be treated as a legal nullity. While the courts or Congress might disagree with this assessment, the President's decision was if the courts were to apply § 3501, not Miranda, the executive would not have to speak of § 3501 in court.
'" I disapprove of this practice. For me, the President's duty to "faithfully execute" the law should stand as a roadblock to the defense of a statute that the President deems unconstitutional. '"' Mike Paulsen puts it this way: "In a bare-knuckled brawl, Congress can reduce the President to little more than a bureaucrat drawing a fixed salary, vetoing bills, granting pardons, and receiving foreign ambassadors-but without funds for hosting a state dinner (or even taking the ambassador to McDonald's)." Paulsen, supra note 83, at 322. Furthermore, as a condition of broad delegations of lawmaking power, presidents may agree to arguably unconstitutional limitations on their Article II prerogatives. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAw & CONTE~IP. PROBS. 273 (Autumn 1993) (citing numerous examples of presidents agreeing to legislati\'e vetoes as a condition on delegated authority). UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 149:251 a constitutionally protected exercise of his Article II powers. Correspondingly, it is simply beside the point that the President's decision might run contrary to language in opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel, calling attention to reasons why a President may want to defend a law that he thinks is unconstitutional. 97 That policy is simply a prudential guideline; it cannot constrain the President's exercise of core Article II powers. 98 To say that the Justice Department was under no obligation to raise § 3501, however, does not tell us how a court should respond to that decision. As an Article III matter, courts were under a duty to take § 3501, "the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions," into account. 99 What, then, is a court to do? On the one hand, it should have heard arguments both supporting and opposing the constitutionality of § 3501. By "'sharpen[ing] the presentation of issues,"' concrete adversariness improves judicial decision-making by helping to ensure the presentation of a full spectrum of theories, both factual and legal. 100 On the other hand, a court could not compel the President to defend the statute. Nor could it dismiss the case for want of adversariness. The executive and the criminal defendant were true adversaries; one side claimed the confession admissible, the other disagreed. Consequently, not only would dismissing the lawsuit due to lack of adversariness have been wrong for Article III reasons, it would have undermined the President's Arti- 97 In an amicus brief filed by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives, the Department of Justice was taken to task for deviating from Office of Legal Counsel policy. Noting that the appellate court upheld the statute's constitutionality, the brief argued that there was ample reason to think § 3501 constitutional and, consequently, the Department's refusal to defend was "extraordi- 1989 ) ("Because federal courts have limited ability to conduct independent investigations, they must depend on the parties to fully present all relevant information to them. It is thought that adverse parties, with a stake in the outcome of the litigation, will perform this task best.").
de II power to independently interpret the Constitution.
101
Specifically, by dismissing the lawsuit, a court would effectively tell the President that all confessions would be kept out of evidence unless and until the President stood ready to defend the applicability of § 3501.
\\'hat then is a court to do? It must allow the case to go forward but it cannot compel either party to defend the statute's constitutionality. In the case of the Fourth Circuit (which had no choice but to resolve the dispute over the confession's admissibility), the options, ultimately, were either to determine § 3501 's constitutionality without the benefit of arguments defending the statute or, alternatively, to appoint counsel to defend the statute. It chose to appoint counsel and that choice seems reasonable.
102
Iol It is wrong, therefore, to analogize Dickerson to lawmaker challenges to either presidential claims of executive prhilege or to a president's war-making and foreign policy powers. In most of those cases, the federal courts have made use of any of a number of the "passive \irtues" to avoid rendering a decision on the merits. For example, in tossing out Senator Bany Goldwater's claim that President Jimmy Carter could not unilaterally rescind a treaty \\ith Taiwan, a plurality of the Court concluded that the matter was a "dispute between two coequal branches of our Government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests." Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist,J., concurring). Goldwater suggests that the Coun \\ill steer clear of Congress-White House disputes unless and until it has to, that is, unless and until the lawsuit becomes Congress's beef, not the beef of a handful of Congressmen. But unlike Goldwater (where it could leave the matter in the hands of the political branches), the Court could not steer clear of Dickerson. The President, after all, was entitled to argue that the confession should be introduced into e\idence. And once the issue of the confession's admissibility was before it, Article III demands that the Court decide the case according to the law.
1 "~ What is unreasonable, however, is the Fourth Circuit's apparent lack of interest in hearing arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 3501. True, as the Dickerson majority points out, the Clinton Justice Department was unwilling to reveal its \iews on this question. At oral argument, counsel for the Justice Department refused to answer questions about § 3501, explaining that "he had been prohibited by his superiors at the Department of Justice from discussing § 3501." United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 681 n.14 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Cassell, supra note 80, at 203-23 (highlighting efforts of the Clinton Justice Department to prevent judicial consideration of § 3501). At the same time, the appellate court never asked the parties to brief the § 3501 issue. According to Dickerson's counsel, james Hundley: "The basis for their decision was never identified as an issue on appeal. We didn't brief this issue at all." Carrie Johnson, A Lonely Crusade: Long Running Assault on Miranda Pays Off, LEGAL TIMES, Feb: 15, 1999, at 8. In particular, the order granting the Washington Legal Foundation time to participate in oral arguments came after briefs had been filed in the case. Moreover, although the parties knew full well that the Washington Legal Foundation would raise the § 3501 issue, the appellate court's order made no mention of § 3501.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, in Independent Insurance Agents, specifically requested the parties address-both in oral arguments and supplement briefsthe continuing ''alidity of the underlying statute. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 149: 251
The Supreme Court had a somewhat different choice. After all, by denying certiorari, it could have simply sidestepped Dickerson. However, the Justices had good reason to hear the case. 103 The issue was important and squarely presented. The Justices, moreover, thought the Fourth Circuit was wrong in upholding the statute. 104 Consequently, a decision denying certiorari would (at least in the Fourth Circuit) allow into evidence confessions that ought to have been suppressed. By hearing the case, moreover, the Justices could accomplish important institutional objectives. Specifically, by concluding that Congress could not overturn Miranda, the Court could speak of the binding nature of their constitutional decisions on other parts of the government. 105 In this way, Dickerson allowed the Justices to protect their turf and, in so doing, facilitate the Rehnquist Court's efforts to expand the authority of the Court vis-a-vis Congress. 103 For a valuable treatment on the steps the Supreme Court takes in deciding whether to grant certiorari, see H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 216-70 (1991) . 104 Even if the Justices did not think about the merits of Dickerson, there were several other reasons supporting a grant of certiorari. First, the Justice Department supported the petition. Second, because the President claimed that the statute was unconstitutional, there was an apparent conflict between the political branches. Third, because other circuits did not sua sponte raise § 3501, there was a conflict of sorts between the Fourth Circuit and other appellate courts.
105 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2328 ("While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, it may not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution." (citations omitted)).
106 See Greenhouse, supra note 16 (stating that the Court might have overturned the bitterly fought five to four Miranda decision had it not been for its recent, notably stron~, desire to protect its constitutional turf against incursions by Congress). 
108
In saying that the Court did the right thing in Dickerson, I do not mean to suggest that courts ought to search out ways to decide cases in which the executive is unwilling to defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress. 109 Dickerson is a truly unusual case, involving the confluence of Congress's Article I power to enact rules of procedure in criminal cases, the courts' Article III duty to take those rules into account, a President's Article II power to repudiate those rules, and the presence of a truly adversarial dispute. In other words, the appointment of an amicus in Dickerson is totally consistent with-even mandated by-the "dispute resolution" model oflitigation.
Contrast these facts to INS v. Chadha.
110
In Chadha, the Department of Justice refused to defend the constitutionality of the legislative veto, preferring, instead, to argue that the veto undermined the President's power to execute the law.m Specifically, the Department thought that a decision by the Attorney General to suspend a deportation was unreviewable by Congress (absent the enactment of legislation which satisfied the Constitution's demands of bicameralism and presentment). Rather than treat the legislative veto as a nullity (by refusing to deport Chadha), however, the Department argued that it was willing to enforce a court ruling upholding the veto. For this reason, the Department argued that the court should settle this "dispute" notwithstanding the case's apparent lack of adversariness. Agreeing with this rationale, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals assured an "adversary presentation of the issues" by allowing the House of Representatives and Senate to intervene in Chadha (but only after hearing oral Court to strike laws down). 
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[Vol. 149: 251 arguments in the case!). 112 The Supreme Court went along with the Justice Department's campaign for a definitive judicial resolution of the legislative veto's constitutionality. 113 But, it should not have. Unlike Dickerson, a decision dismissing the case would not have interfered with the President's Article II powers to both interpret the Constitution and "faithfully execute the laws." The only thing preventing the Attorney General from suspending Chadha's deportation was his hope that the Supreme Court would rule on the constitutionality of the legislative veto. Correspondingly, as an Article III matter, the Chadha litigation was an abomination.
114 The desire for a court decision, in and of itself, does not support judicial resolution of a case in which there is no disagreement.
The lesson here is simple. A President's power to interpret the Constitution is not the power to demand judicial rulings on these interpretations. 113 The Justice Department saw Chadha as the perfect vehicle to challenge the legislative veto. By finding that Chadha did not meet the statutory requirements of "hardship," the legislative veto became a clear intrusion into the executive's power to implement the law. See CRAIG, supra note 111, at 167 (proposing that in Chadha the Justice Department was seeking the Court's "stamp of approval"). For this reason, Chadha, not Dickerson, may be the emblematic case of conservatives willing to suspend their campaign against judicial activism in order to advance their ideological agenda in court.
114 My complaint here is that the courts created a case or controversy by allowing de facto legislative standing without the usual requisites. Indeed, there was good reason to think that Chadha was moot. By marrying an American citizen, Chadha was entitled to stay in the United States. See8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (1994) ("Any person ... whose spouse is ... a citizen of the United States ... may be naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws .... "). Of course, it may be that the Justices reached out to decide Chadha because they were eager to strike down the legislative veto. But this desire to expound on the Constitution's meaning should give way to the jurisdictional demands of (1984) (describing the Court's actions in Bob jOTUS as an attempt to legislate on a politically controversial issue when there was no longer a need for judicial resolution). Ne\'ertheless, the political cost of granting a tax break to Bob Jones University was too much for the Reagan administration. Consequently, after announcing its plan to restore Bob jones University's tax-exempt status (and petitioning the Supreme Court to moot the school's challenge to the government's earlier denial of tax-exempt status), the administration once again reversed course-this time asking the Justices to appoint counsel to defend the government's earlier practice of denying tax breaks to racist schools. !d. Rather than grant this request, the Court should have forced the administration to bear the costs of a politically unpopular decision. 117 As a matter of pure politics, presidents have always found that the benefits of agreeing to the legislative veto--expansive delegations of power-have always outweighed the costs-conditions on the exercise of delegated power. See generally Fisher, supra note 96, at 277-84 (noting several presidents who have agreed to legislative vetoes as a condition on delegated authority). For this reason, the 'White House had much to gain in seeking the judicial invalidation of the legislative veto.
11
" This, after all, is the logic of Goldwater v. CaM, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) ("The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse."), and other cases denying lawmakers standing to challenge executive branch decisionmaking. With respect to the legislative veto, the President could take his complaint to Conr,ess simply by refusing to enforce or to sign bills with legislative veto prO\isions. 
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[Vol. 149: 251 power to independently interpret the Constitution support both the sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and the appointment of counsel to defend the constitutionality of the statute. 120 But, much more than the separation of powers is at stake in Dickerson. A decision forbidding the courts' consideration of legal theories not raised by the litigants would cast doubt on the rule of law.
Let me explain. The rule of law is anchored in the belief that law is binding (especially on the sovereign) and, consequently, that the administration of law must conform with the declared rule.
121
By authoritatively settling what is to be done, the rule of law fosters "the virtues of reliance, predictability, and stability[, and] by reducing variance in individual cases," the rule of law allows both individuals and government officials to plan their lives. 122 Needless to say, the law is subject to interpretation. Furthermore, executive officials, especially prosecutors, possess significant discretion in administering the law. At the same time, the rule of law presupposes that an independent judiciary will base its decisionmaking on the law, not the policy priorities of the executive branch. 123 Imagine the alternative, that is, a regime in which the parties to a dispute define the "law." Courts, lacking the power to independently look to the governing law, would rule under the terms and conditions of the parties who pursue litigation. Most of the time, one or the other party will have real incentives to call attention to the governing law. That, of course, is the premise of the adversarial system, namely, that the parties to a dispute will seek to advance their cause by advancing all pertinent legal arguments that support their position. Some of the time, however, neither party will have incentive to call the governing law to the court's attention. This was true of Dickerson, Erie, and, to .
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n o er occaswns, moreover, a party quite willing to raise an issue will not. This may be a result of bad lawyering or the simple failure to realize that the court is interested in, say, reconsidering a longstanding interpretation of the Constitution or some federal statute. This was true in Independent Insurance Agents as well as a host of cases where courts have looked to amicus briefs 125 and other sources to glean the appropriate legal standard to apply.
The costs of leaving it to opposing counsel to call the governing law to the court's attention cannot be overestimated. In such aregime, precedent would give way to party arguments-so that the law would no longer act as a stabilizing force. 126 Furthermore, an independent judiciary would no longer see to it that the sovereign operated within the rule of law; instead, it would be up to opposing counsel to call the governing law to the court's attention. My point here is not that the rule of law presupposes that courts see themselves as an expositor of norms, nor as resolvers of individual disputes. 129 It is, instead, that courts should not knowingly apply the wrong legal standard. When an issue is squarely before the court (as was the admissibility of Dickerson's confession), courts must look to the law, not just the arguments of the parties before it.
In other words, notwithstanding our commitment to the adversarial system, there must be enough play in the joints that [a federal court] need not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it- 128 In Dickerson, the rule of men (adherence to Miranda irrespective of the constirutionality of the 1968 starute) was more protective of the criminal defendant than the rule of law (adherence to the 1968 starute unless that starute was found unconstirutional). In another case, however, the rule of men might be less rights-protective than the rule of law. For example, proposed legislation would require federal courts to order DNA testing from the crime scene, at government expense if the accused cannot pay for it. James Q. Wilson YALE LJ. 801, 803-04 (1990) (asserting that the judicial branch's ability to establish a rule of law enables the branch to serve as an expositor of norms). Consider, for example, the rule of law demand that a court must first satisfY itself that it has jurisdiction before it addresses the merits of a dispute. For a proponent of the "dispute resolution" model, the rule oflaw is honored by treating jurisdiction as a very real constraint on a court's power to "say what the law is." In contrast, proponents of the "public values" model would treat jurisdiction as a de minimis constraint on the judiciary's power to speak to the merits. 130 This is especially true when Congress has enacted legislation prohibiting parties from waiving a legal theory in support of their claim. By mandating judicial consideration of that legal theory, Congress-consistent with its supervisory powers over the federal courts-has defined which legal issues should be before the court. Of course, as was true in Dickerson, a court can claim that Congress acted unconstirutionally. But it cannot claim that principles of judicial economy prevent it from sua sponte considering matters that neither party raised in their filings. See supra notes 32, 51, 129 and accompanying text (arguing that the judiciary's raising of sua sponte issues conforms to the "dispute resolution" model of litigation). UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol.l49: 251
"What a government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps humanly possible to stay within its powers."
134
In Dickerson, the Justice Department claim that Miranda, not the 1968 statute, is the standard governing the admissibility of confessions has now been validated by the Supreme Court. In other words, by sua sponte raising the 1968 statute and by appointing counsel to defend the statute, the judiciary has legitimated this Justice Department position. In contrast, a decision steering clear of the 1968 statute, because neither party invoked it, would have cast doubt on this Justice Department position. More fundamentally, such a decision would suggest that the President-at least sometimes-is not bound by the law.
Of course, the Supreme Court could have upheld the 1968 statute. Had this occurred, the President might well have resisted the Court (and Congress) by continuing to utilize the Miranda standard. Even here, however, the Constitution would be made more vibrant and stable. The logic of our system of checks and balances, as Alexander Bickel wrote, is that "the effectiveness of the whole depends on [each branch's] involvement with one another ... even if it often is the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat. " 135 More to the point, by exercising his power of presidential review, the meaning of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would play out in a dialogue between the branches and the people. For example, by continuing to argue that Miranda is the appropriate benchmark, the executive could press its case to the courts-to reconsider their ruling-to the Congress-to repeal the 1968 statute-and to the people-to use the ballot box and other mechanisms to support Miranda.
CONCLUSION
The separation of powers and the rule of law both support the sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and appointment of counsel to defend the statute. While a desire to undo Miranda may have been the motivation for all this, 136 it is nevertheless true that a court committed to judicial restraint would have followed a similar course. Just as a president must independently interpret the Constitution, courts must
